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INADEQUACY OF TRIPS & THE
COMPULSORY LICENSE: WHY BROAD
COMPULSORY LICENSING IS NOT A
VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE ACCESS TO
MEDICINE PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION

E

rectile dysfunction, cancer, and HIV/AIDS are not generally thought of as falling within the same class of medical
illness. Erectile dysfunction is often characterized as a non-lifethreatening condition,1 while cancer is labeled a life-style disease,2 and HIV/AIDS as an epidemic.3 Yet, medications for all
three health problems have had their drug patents broken by a
compulsory license under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).4 The goal of
TRIPS is to provide access to essential medications in cases of
national public health emergency by granting a compulsory license of a patented medication.5 The drafters’ intent was to
balance intellectual property (“IP”) rights with access to affordable medications.6 Yet the vagueness of TRIPS and its compulsory license provisions, specifically Articles 30 and 31, has
caused much controversy and opposition.7 Consequently,
TRIPS has not been utilized to its fullest nor has it been utilized as its drafters intended. It is doubtful, for example, that
the drafters of TRIPS intended erectile dysfunction to be covered under the Article 31 public health emergency exception to
1. See Erectile Dysfunction Treatment, REVITA: ANTI-AGING CENTER,
http://www.revitaantiagingcenter.com/erectile-dysfunction-treatment/
(last
visited Feb. 20, 2013).
2. See Cancer is a Preventable Lifestyle Disease, TIME FOR WELLNESS
(Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.timeforwellness.org/blog-view/cancer-is-apreventable-lifestyle-disease-115.
3. See David Gratzer, The WTO’s Drug Problem, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE
POLICY RESEARCH
(Jan.
21,
2003),
http://www.manhattanFOR
institute.org/html/miarticle.htm?id=3276.
4. See Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS
MED., Jan. 2012, at 1, 4.
5. See Gratzer, supra note 3.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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patent rights, which allows third parties to manufacture a patented medication without the consent of the patent owner. 8 At
the other end of the spectrum, HIV/AIDS is explicitly covered
under this exception.9 Furthermore, as the number of cancer
deaths increases, it has become less clear whether life-style
disease medications should be covered.10 Thus, as these three
brief examples illustrate, the scope of compulsory licenses must
be better defined to properly balance the countervailing goals of
IP rights with access to medicines, and to allow TRIPS to more
successfully achieve these dual goals.
Balancing countervailing goals is never an easy feat, especially in international IP where countries vary in economic, social,
and cultural terms.11 It follows, then, that providing access to
affordable medicines has been a challenge for the international
community, which must balance improving global health
against the IP rights of patent holders of life-saving medications.12 Both interests are supported by parties having deeply
entrenched goals with different primary priorities and different
approaches.13 On the one hand, developing countries and nonprofit organizations have a primary focus of ensuring access to
affordable medicines for those in poverty.14 Developing countries often lack the capabilities and infrastructure to create IP,
such as patentable drugs, and are thus primarily IP importers,
and lack an incentive to protect IP.15 These countries favor
weaker IP rights,16 which allow market entry of generic drug

8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Kevin Outterson, Disease-Based Limitations on Compulsory Licenses Under Articles 31 and 31bis, 1–2, 17–21 (B.U. Sch. Law, Working Paper No. 09–26, 2009).
11. See Daniel C.K. Chow & Edward Lee, INTERNATIONAL IP: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 197 (2006).
12. See Brittany Whobrey, International Patent Law and Public Health:
Analyzing TRIPS’ Effect on Access to Pharmaceuticals in Developing Countries, 45 BRANDEIS L.J., 623–624 (2007).
13. See Alexandra G. Watson, International IP Rights: Do TRIPS’ Flexibilities Permit Sufficient Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Medicines in Developing Countries?, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 149–150 (2009).
14. See Whobrey, supra note 12, at 623–624.
15. Chow, supra note 11, at 12.
16. See Whobrey, supra note 12, at 625.
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manufacturers and increased market competition.17 Market
entry and competition lower drug prices, resulting in increased
availability of affordable medications.18 On the other hand, developed countries and the pharmaceutical industry primarily
focus on protecting their valuable IP, namely patented medications.19 Developed countries are primarily IP exporters20 and
thus seek stronger IP rights to ensure protection both abroad
and domestically.21 Similarly, pharmaceutical companies assert
that strong IP rights are required to recoup their research and
development costs—which can exceed $800 million for each
successful drug—and to incentivize future innovation.22
Although neither concern over global health nor IP are new
issues in the international community, they were initially contemplated as separate and competing interests and were only
brought together for the first time under TRIPS. International
commitment to global health was highlighted as early as the
1940s with the formation of the United Nations,23 the World
Health Organization,24 and the World Bank Group25 and has
been reaffirmed repeatedly, appearing in the Millennium Development Goals26 established by the United Nations Millennium Declaration27 in September 2000. Likewise, protection of IP
rights through international initiatives is not a novel concept;

17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Chow, supra note 11, at 453.
20. Id. at 12.
21. See id. at 8–9.
22. Id. at 10–11, 453.
NATIONS,
23. UN
at
a
Glance,
UNITED
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
HEALTH
ORGANIZATION,
24. About
WHO,
WORLD
http://www.who.int/about/en/ (last visited June 13, 2013).
25. HIV/AIDS Prevention Additional Financing, THE WORLD BANK,
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P144537/hivaids-prevention-additionalfinancing?lang=en (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
26. Background, UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
27. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept.
18,
2000),
available
at
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf.
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it is rooted in the 1883 Paris Convention,28 which was echoed
with the formation of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”)29 in 1967 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty30
in 1970. However, in 1994, when the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”)31 adopted TRIPS,32 the two competing interests
clashed. TRIPS linked IP to trade, and trade affects access to
medications.33 Though the TRIPS negotiations pitted developing and developed countries against each other,34 all 153 WTO
member countries adopted TRIPS on April 15, 1994, which attempted to create strong international IP rights by setting
basic standards.35 However, in an attempt to balance strong IP
rights with access to essential medicines, TRIPS included certain flexibilities intended to support global health, particularly
compulsory licensing and parallel importation,36 which will be
discussed infra in Part I.B.
This Note will analyze whether TRIPS has successfully balanced its two competing goals of protecting IP and improving
access to medicines. The analysis will illustrate several impediments to TRIPS in the approximately fifteen years after its

28. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883,
21
U.S.T.
1583,
828
U.N.T.S.
305,
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.p
df.
29. About WIPO, WORLD IP ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/aboutwipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
30. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160
U.N.T.S. 231, available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf.
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
31. The
WTO,
WORLD
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2013).
32. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IP Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
33. Chow, supra note 11, at 25.
34. See Watson, supra note 13, at 149–150.
35. The WTO, supra note 31; Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents Obligations and Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm (2011) [hereinafter TRIPS Fact Sheet]. Currently there are 193 WTO member countries
which have all adopted TRIPS. Tina S. Bhatt, Note, Amending TRIPS: A New
Hope for Increased Access to Essential Medicines, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 597,
600 (2008).
36. The WTO, supra note 31; TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 35.
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implementation and will highlight special challenges concerning access to chronic disease medications. This analysis will
show that TRIPS is an ineffective solution for the access to
medicine problem. The Note will then suggest recommendations for amending TRIPS to better achieve its two policy goals,
as well as suggest a supplemental market approach to TRIPS
that will best ensure access to both communicable (i.e., infectious) and non-communicable (i.e., chronic) disease medications.
In light of the treaty’s deficiencies, the amendment to TRIPS
proposed here will require a three-tier pricing system and will
also prohibit parallel importation. A supplementary market
approach will be an alternative to compulsory licensing. The
market approach for all practical purposes must be advantageous to pharmaceutical companies and developed countries,
while still providing needed medications to developing countries. Under this approach, compulsory licensing should have a
limited scope and interpretation, as the market alternative
should be the dominant route to distribute medications. Part I
will discuss the timeline and background of international IP
initiatives and will end with a discussion of the relevant provisions of TRIPS. Part II will identify problems and recent impediments to TRIPS. Part III will survey special challenges in
the area of chronic diseases. Finally, Part IV will propose recommendations to strengthen TRIPS and to better promote its
dual goals in the face of increased hostility and dissatisfaction
of all involved parties.
I. BACKGROUND
A. International IP Initiatives: Road to TRIPS
The first international IP agreement was the Paris Convention of 1883.37 Although it was a major step to address IP on a
global scale, the Paris Convention lacked substantive standards for IP, and left member countries to structure their domestic IP laws as desired.38 For example, the Paris Convention
did not impose a standard definition of patentable subject mat37. Chow, supra note 11, at 25.
38. Id. at 270.
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ter, resulting in inconsistencies where some countries excluded
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology from patent protection.39
Lack of enforcement capabilities presented additional limitations to the Paris Convention.40 A more significant attempt at
international harmonization occurred in 1967 with the creation
of WIPO, a specialized agency under the United Nations.41
However, like the Paris Convention, WIPO lacked a global enforcement mechanism.42 In 1994, the WTO adopted TRIPS,
which is currently the leading international IP treaty and links
IP to trade.43
The key improvement that makes TRIPS a stronger treaty
than past international IP regimes is its enforcement capability, established through “an elaborate Dispute Settlement
Body” under the WTO.44 Due to this improvement, TRIPS is
not a “toothless organization” and has “real powers to impose
[trade] sanctions” on member countries that do not comply with
the minimal substantive IP standards set forth in TRIPS.45
Further, TRIPS includes minimal standardized substantive

39. Id.
40. Id. at 26.
41. See Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 248 (2009).
42. See Chow, supra note 11, at 26. The WIPO international harmonization effort was much larger, containing 175 member countries, compared to
only eleven member countries bound by the Paris Convention. See Kaminski,
supra note 41, at 248; Chow, supra note 11, at 64.
43. Chow, supra note 11, at 25, 58.
44. Id. at 26.
When one member challenges another’s actions as violating a specific WTO agreement or principle, the issue is brought before the Dispute Resolution Body (DRB). The DRB holds proceedings and issues
decisions . . . . If a country loses a dispute and does not cooperate and
abide by the DRB’s decisions, the WTO has the power to authorize
trade sanctions against the losing party.
Whobrey, supra note 12, at 628; TRIPS is a non-self-executing treaty, as articulated in Article 1.1, meaning each member country must enact domestic
legislation to comply with the standards set forth in TRIPS. Chow, supra note
11, at 289; see TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 68 (establishing the TRIPS Council
to monitor compliance by member countries with TRIPS and to interpret its
provisions); see also Chow, supra note 11, at 292.
45. Chow, supra note 11, at 26, 58.
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rights for patent protection,46 lacking in past international IP
agreements. For example, TRIPS prohibits denying patents
“based on the field of technology” and thus requires all member
countries to protect pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents.47 It also requires patent protection for a minimum of
twenty years in member countries.48 Attempting to balance
these stronger IP standards, TRIPS also includes exceptions,
called TRIPS flexibilities, in order to appease the competing
interest of global health.49
B. Relevant Provisions of TRIPS: TRIPS Flexibilities
1. General Public Health Provisions
Article 28 of TRIPS lays out the exclusive rights of patent
holders, namely, the exclusive right to make, use, offer for sale,
sell, or import the patented good.50 The patent holder also has
the exclusive right to assign, transfer, or license the patent.51
The compromise and balance between strong IP rights and attempts to promote public health is seen generally in Article

46. See id. at 271. Substantive minimum standards of patent protection in
TRIPS include, but are not limited to:
[First,] countries must allow for the patenting of processes and may
not deny patents based on the field of technology . . . . [Second,]
TRIPS also delineates what exclusive rights a patent must entail
and for how long, and puts limitations on when countries may enact
exceptions or compulsory licenses to patents . . . . [Third, TRIPS] also
requires countries to afford judicial review of any revocation or forfeiture of a patent.
Id.; see TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 27–34 (setting the minimal terms for patent protection).
47. Chow, supra note 11, at 271; TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 27(1). Prior to
TRIPS over forty countries had no patent protection for pharmaceutical
products. Josephine Johnston & Angela A. Wasunna, Patents, Biomedical
Research, and Treatments: Examining Concerns, Canvassing Solutions, 37
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT (SPECIAL REPORT), no.1, S1, S5 (2007).
48. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 33.
49. See Bhatt, supra note 35, at 600. See also TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra
note 35; Chow, supra note 11, at 336.
50. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 28(1).
51. Id. art. 28(2).
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8(1) and Article 27(2).52 Article 8(1) demonstrates that public
health was a concern during the drafting of TRIPS, where it
allows member countries to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health, nutrition, and to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”53 Article 27(2)
excludes patentability of inventions that are “necessary to protect the ordre public or morality,” including those inventions
that protect human life or health.54
2. Compulsory Licensing
Article 30 and Article 31 more clearly state the exceptions to
the IP rights held by a patent owner and attempt to address
the access to medicine concern of developing countries. These
exceptions are often referred to as the “TRIPS flexibilities.”55
Article 30 allows member countries to provide “limited exceptions” to a patent holder’s exclusive rights,56 “provided that
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the
legitimate interests of third parties.”57 Article 31 offers a more
detailed exception to a patent holder’s exclusive rights, specifically the compulsory license exception.58 This exception requires a third party to first attempt to negotiate a voluntary
license with the patent holder before requesting a compulsory
license through the third party’s government.59 However, Article 31 allows third parties to bypass the voluntary license negotiation in cases of “a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency60 or in cases of public non-commercial
52. See id. art. 8(1), 27(2).
53. Id. art. 8(1).
54. Id. art. 27(2).
55. Bhatt, supra note 35, at 600.
56. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 28, 30 (Article 28 refers to the patent holder’s exclusive rights).
57. Id. art. 30.
58. See id. art. 31.
59. Id. art. 31(b).
60. See discussion infra Part II.A.3. TRIPS does not define “national emergency” or “extreme urgency”—a deficiency that will be discussed below.
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use.”61 This emergency compulsory license exception is limited
to requiring compulsory licenses to be “authorized predominantly” for domestic use.62
3. Parallel Importation
In addition to the compulsory license, another significant
TRIPS flexibility is the concept of parallel importation alluded
to in Article 6.63 Parallel importation results from price discrimination, where a particular product is sold at different
prices in different countries, and is based on the concept of exhaustion.64 Exhaustion, or the first sale doctrine, states that
after a sale the prior possessor of a product relinquishes all
rights to the product and the new possessor is able to distribute
and import it at will.65 Opponents of exhaustion, including
pharmaceutical companies, contend that it “decreases profitability and removes the incentive to sell drugs to poor countries
at lower prices.”66 Further, there is a concern that some corrupt
governments of developing countries may resell the discounted
drugs received at higher profits to other countries, rather than
provide the discounted drugs to their citizens in need.67 TRIPS
neither bans nor authorizes parallel importation.68
C. Response to TRIPS: International Clarification of TRIPS
1. The Doha Declaration
After developing countries raised concerns as to the scope of
interpretation of the TRIPS flexibilities and its relation to the
issue of access to medicines, the WTO issued a Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health at a conference in Doha, Qatar in
61. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 31(b). TRIPS requires “adequate remuneration” be paid to the patent holder in cases where a government does in fact
grant a compulsory license. Id. art. 30(h).
62. Id. art. 31(f).
63. See id. art. 6.
64. Chow, supra note 11, at 428.
65. Id. at 419.
66. Whobrey, supra note 12, at 633.
67. Id.
68. See TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 6 (“[N]othing in this Agreement shall be
used to address the issue of exhaustion . . . .”).
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2001.69 The Doha Declaration70 reaffirmed the need to balance
grave “public health problems afflicting many developing . . .
countries”71 with “intellectual property protection[, which] is
important for the development of new medicines.”72 Further,
paragraph four of the Doha Declaration states that TRIPS
“should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO member’s right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all” and that the
flexibilities were provided “for this purpose.”73 The Doha Declaration also affirms that each member country can determine
the circumstances for granting compulsory licenses, the circumstances constituting a national emergency, and can establish its own policy on exhaustion.74 It specifically states that a
public health crisis may include, but is not limited to, those “relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.”75
Lastly, the Doha Declaration recognizes a problem created by
Article 31(f) of TRIPS regarding the use of compulsory licenses.76 Article 31(f) restricts compulsory licenses to manufacturing goods “predominantly” in the domestic country.77 However,
many developing countries do not have the manufacturing, infrastructure, or expertise to domestically produce pharmaceutical products and thus these countries would not be able to use
the compulsory license flexibility.78 Paragraph six of the Doha
69. Chow, supra note 11, at 459.
70. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001: Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Public Health
Declaration].
71. Id. ¶ 1 (specifically recognizing public health concerns in “HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics”).
72. Id. ¶ 3.
73. Id. ¶ 4.
74. Id. ¶ 5.
75. Id. ¶ 5(c).
76. Vishal Gupta, A Mathematical Approach to Benefit-Detriment Analysis
as a Solution to Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS
Agreement, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 631, 643 (2005).
77. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 31(f).
78. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 70, ¶ 6. See also Chow,
supra note 11, at 461. “[A]bout 80% of developing countries lack a functional
pharmaceutical sector capable of producing [antiretroviral medications used
to treat HIV/AIDS].” Aileen M. McGill, Compulsory Licensing of Patented
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Declaration recognizes this issue and requests the WTO Council for TRIPS79 to propose a solution.80
2. Paragraph Six Decision
On August 30, 2003, the WTO General Council reached a solution to the problem recognized in paragraph six of the Doha
Declaration.81 This solution, known as the “Implementation
Decision” or “Paragraph 6 Decision,” created a waiver for Article 31(f) of TRIPS by which a country that lacks manufacturing
capabilities may now import a specific pharmaceutical product.82 However, the Paragraph 6 Decision contains a number of
restrictions on this waiver, complicating the importation process.83 In 2005, the WTO General Council voted to amend
TRIPS to permanently include the Implementation Decision as
Article 31bis.84 The amendment will take effect after acceptance by two-thirds of the member countries.85
Pharmaceuticals: Why A WTO Administrative Body Should Determine What
Constitutes a Public Health Crisis Under The Doha Declaration, 10 WAKE
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69, 93 (2009).
79. TRIPS supra note 32, art. 68 (establishing the Council for TRIPS to
monitor the operation of TRIPS and members’ compliance with their obligations, and affords members the opportunity to consult the Council on related
matters).
80. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 70, ¶ 6.
81. Decisions of General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and
Corr. 1, 43 I.L.M. 509 (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Implementation Agreement].
82. Id. ¶ 2.
83. Id. The waiver applies only “for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product. . . .” Id. It also imposes several notification requirements
and labeling requirements. Id. ¶ 2(b)(iii).
84. TRIPS and Public Health: Members Accepting Amendment of the
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
TRIPS
Agreement,
WORLD
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated
Jan. 5, 2012); see also Chow, supra note 11, at 464.
85. TRIPS and Public Health, supra note 84. The deadline to accept the
amendment has been pushed back to December 31, 2013. Id. As of February
16, 2013, forty-three of the 155 members have approved the amendment, including the United States. Id.; Understanding the WTO: The Organization
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
Members
and
Observers,
WORLD
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited
May 10, 2012) (listing all 155 members and observers of the WTO).
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II. PROBLEMS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO TRIPS & ACCESS TO
MEDICINES
A survey of a multitude of factors highlights the problems
and impediments to successful use of TRIPS. These include:
complicated procedural requirements, actual use of compulsory
licensing, definitional ambiguities, limitations inherent in developing countries, retaliation by pharmaceutical companies
and developed countries, and legal challenges to compulsory
license laws and grants. As a result of these factors TRIPS has
not been used to its fullest ability and has also not been used as
its drafters intended. Consequently, the dual goals of balancing
IP rights with access to essential medicines have not been fully
achieved.
A. Problems
1. Complicated Procedural Requirements
Compulsory licensing is a complicated process requiring a
number of procedural hurdles to be met prior to issuing the
compulsory license.86 “Even if a developing country is ultimately successful in authorizing a compulsory license . . . the delays
in authorization due to [the mandatory] judicial review [or other independent review] may discourage licensees from producing generic versions . . . as they will have less time to recover
start-up costs.”87 Further, the Paragraph 6 Decision is not a

86. See generally Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or
Failure, as Measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367,
390–392 (2011). TRIPS Article 31(a)—(l) states a long list of procedural requirements a country must satisfy prior to compulsory licensing, which include: “use [of the license] shall be considered on its individual merit,” “scope
and duration of the use must be limited to the authorized purpose,” “judicial
or other independent review of the use authorization,” use is “contingent on
adequate remuneration” to the patent holder, which “must take into account
the economic value of the authorization” and is “subject to judicial or other
independent review.” Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469, 1488 (2007) [hereinafter A New World Order]. But see id. (“Despite the long list of procedural
requirements . . . compliance with these requirements has not generally been
an issue.”).
87. Brent Savoie, Thailand’s Test: Compulsory Licensing in an Era of Epidemiologic Transition, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 239 (2007).
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streamlined procedure and is time-consuming, expensive, and
has been rarely used.88 In addition, many countries have not
enacted domestic legislation to incorporate the Paragraph 6
Decision, making it non-operational.89 Canada was the first
and only country to use the Paragraph 6 Decision to export a
generic AIDS drug to Rwanda after issuance of a compulsory
license.90 However, due to the complicated process (cumbersome to both the eligible exporting and importing countries),
lack of incentives, huge costs, time commitment, and challenges in recovery costs, the director of public affairs for the generic
drug firm stated that it would not use the Paragraph 6 system
again.91 Fears that the procedures for the Paragraph 6 Decision
The longer the issuance of compulsory licenses is delayed after patented drugs enter the marketplace, the less time licensees have to
recover their start-up costs and the more difficult it is to achieve effective competition among multiple generic substitute suppliers.
Thus, if compulsory licensing is to be successful, expeditious licensing procedures are a necessity.
F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented
Medicines in Developing Nations, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 913, 924 (2002).
88. See generally A New World Order, supra note 86, at 1492–1493 (providing an overview of the procedures and requirements prior to allowing compulsory licensing of drugs for export under the Paragraph 6 Decision); Harris,
supra note 86, at 389–392; Holger Hestermeyer, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 261–272 (2007) (offering a more detailed overview of the Paragraph 6 Decision and its procedural
requirements).
89. A New World Order, supra note 86, at 1491–1492. Norway, Canada,
India, and the EU are the only potential exporting countries that have formally informed the TRIPS Council that they have enacted domestic legislation to comply with the Paragraph 6 Decision. TRIPS and Health: Frequently
Asked Questions— Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS,
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
WORLD
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (2006).
90. Harris, supra note 86, at 389–390.
91. Id. at 389–391. It took more than four years to ship generic AIDS medications to Rwanda, where two years were spent negotiating between the generic drug manufacturer and the patent holders. Id. Concerns over the compulsory license being issued for too short a term—making it difficult for the
generic drug maker to recover costs for investing in the manufacture of the
medicines—further complicates the issue. Id. The scope and duration of a
compulsory license is limited by Article 31(c), where the compulsory license
must be terminated when the circumstances for the issuance of the compul-
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are “so complicated that it will remain virtually unused until
the WTO reforms the system to make it less cumbersome and
more streamlined” were presented during the TRIPS Council’s
October 2010 meeting.92
2. Actual Use of Compulsory Licensing
Few countries have made use of the TRIPS flexibilities.93
Over the approximately fifteen years that Article 31 has been
in force, only a handful of countries have issued compulsory
licenses under its authority, and only one country has issued a
compulsory license under the 2003 Paragraph 6 Decision.94 The
disuse of the TRIPS flexibilities and the United States’ and
pharmaceutical companies’ negative reactions to South Africa’s
1997 attempt to provide cheaper HIV/AIDS medications led to
clarification of TRIPS in the Doha Declaration.95 Eight years
after Doha, and fifteen years after the signing of TRIPS, only
fifty-two countries have issued compulsory licenses.96 Some
sory license ceases. Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 250. However, an important caveat is that the “legitimate interests of the beneficiary of the license must be adequately protected.” Id. This caveat is important because
“the beneficiary of a license has to make investments before it can work the
license and it would be difficult to find a beneficiary willing to do so if the
license is liable to be terminated at any given moment.” Id.
92. Harris, supra note 86, at 391–392. Concerns over the limited use of the
Paragraph 6 mechanism were also discussed at the March 2010 TRIPS Council meeting. Id. at 391; see also William New, WTO Paragraph 6 Meeting
Aims At Improved Use Of Health Waiver, IP WATCH (Oct. 16, 2010, 5:20pm),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/10/16/wto-paragraph-6-meeting-aimsat-improved-use-of-health-waiver/.
93. But see Savoie, supra note 87, at 237 (stating that although compulsory
licensing has not been utilized extensively, there is a recent trend towards
increased issuance of compulsory licenses by developing countries).
94. See generally Harris, supra note 86, at 387–390.
95. Savoie, supra note 87, at 234; see generally Pier DeRoo, Public Non—
Commercial Use: Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Drugs in Government Health Care Programs, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 347, 354–359 (2011) (providing a detailed overview of South Africa’s 1997 attempt at National Emergency Compulsory Licensing for HIV/AIDS medications and the negative reactions that followed).
96. Ellen F. M. ‘t Hoen, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION
OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH xv-xvi (2009).
“Between 2001 and end 2007, 52 developing and least-developed countries
have issued post-Doha compulsory licenses for production or import of generic
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countries, particularly Brazil, threaten using compulsory licenses as a negotiation tool to lower drug prices.97 However, it
is the actual use of compulsory licenses that achieves the lowest prices, not mere threats.98
Since compulsory licensing is infrequently used, TRIPS has
not effectively reduced the price of drugs on a broad scale,
which is essential to increasing access to medicines.99 Newer,
more effective drugs are six times more expensive than older
treatments where the patents have expired.100 Further, when
compulsory licensing is used, TRIPS limits generic manufacturers to producing only the quantities predefined in each compulsory license.101 This limitation “curbs the large-scale producversions of patented medicines, given effect to government use provisions,
and/or implemented the non-enforcement of patents.” Id. at xvi; see, e.g., Examples of Health—Related Compulsory Licenses, CONSUMER PROJECT ON
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2011) (listing examples of countries and their issuance of
health related compulsory licenses); see also Dep’t of Indust. Pol’y & Promotion, Discussion Paper—Compulsory Licensing, GOV’T OF INDIA MINISTRY OF
COMMERCE & INDUS.,
at
3
(Aug.
24,
2010),
available
at
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Archive/ArchiveFeed.aspx; see also DeRoo, supra
note 95, at 358–359.
97. See Harris, supra note 86, at 387–388. Brazil’s use of its compulsory
licensing provision as a negotiation tool has lowered HIV mortality rates by
50% in the 536,000 HIV infected Brazilians. Chow, supra note 11, at 454.
98. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Brazil Takes Steps To Import Cheaper AIDS
Drug Under Trade Law, IP WATCH (May 7, 2007, 1:50pm), http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2007/05/07/brazil-takes-steps-to-import-cheaper-aids-drugunder-trade-law/?res=1280&print=0. Negotiations between Thailand and
Merck, and between Brazil and Merck, for the HIV/AIDS drug efavirenz show
that the pharmaceutical companies offered their lowest prices after receiving
a compulsory license. Id.
Brazil had achieved a price for efavirenz of $580 per patient per year
earlier when it had threatened to use compulsory license. But this
was too expensive compared with the price for generics (Thailand
was offered $244 per patient per year after it issued a [compulsory
license]), and thus Brazil has paid too much for too many years. . . .
Id. Also, when few or no licenses are actually issued, repeated, hollow threats
of use erode the negotiating power of the compulsory license. Id.
99. Bhatt, supra note 35, at 600.
100. AIDS,
Drug
Prices
and
Generic
Drugs,
AVERT,
http://www.avert.org/generic.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) [hereinafter
AVERT] (discussing, specifically, pricing of HIV/AIDS drugs).
101. Id.
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tion that is required to deliver drugs cheaply.”102 Also, some
argue the price of drugs after a compulsory license does not justify the massive intrusion on patent rights because the price is
not low enough and is still out of reach for the poor.103 Moreover, actually granting a compulsory license is not necessary to
lower the price of drugs.104 Market competition and negotiations between large pharmaceutical companies and generic
drug manufacturers have proven to lower drug prices. For example, a price war and social pressure, not issuance of a compulsory license between the pharmaceutical company and the
generic drug makers, led to AIDS medications being reduced
from about $10,000 per person per year in 1996 to $295 in
2001.105
Further, compulsory licenses have been predominantly issued for health related emergencies of HIV/AIDS, and thus
their use has been very limited in scope.106 In addition, despite
compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs, 14.6 million people
globally still lacked access to antiretroviral drugs at the end of
2009, which translates to a mere 36% coverage rate.107 In the
2011 Millennium Development Goals Report, the WHO stated
that it had not reached its 2010 target for universal access to
HIV/AIDS treatment.108 91% of pregnant women in need of antiretroviral drugs live in largely impoverished sub-Saharan Af-

102. Id.
103. Watson, supra note 13, at 154.
104. See generally AVERT, supra note 100.
105. Id.
106. See ‘t Hoen, supra note 96, at xvi–xvii; DeRoo, supra note 95, at 359.
But see DeRoo, supra note 95, at 359–362 (discussing the Thai experience in
the January 25, 2007, compulsory licensing of Plavix, a heart disease medication, under the public non-commercial use provision of TRIPS); but see, e.g.,
Beth Jinks & Suttinee Yuvejwattana, Thailand to Buy Generic Plavix in India, Snubs Sanofi (Update1), BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2007 12:13 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aQ3E3cABtPX
U.
107. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011, UNITED NATIONS, at
41
(2011),
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/(2011_E)%20MDG%20Report%20201
1_Book%20LR.pdf [hereinafter MDG Report 2011]. But see AVERT, supra
note 100 (“Around 8 million people in low- and middle-income countries are
currently receiving drugs to treat HIV/AIDS.”).
108. MDG Report 2011, supra note 107, at 41.
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rica.109 Of course, other diseases still run rampant in low and
middle-income countries. For example, 90% of malaria deaths
still occur in sub-Saharan Africa, and 85% of new tuberculosis
cases occur in Asia and Africa.110
3. Definitional Ambiguities & Ambiguities in Scope
Ambiguities in the interpretation of TRIPS due to the lack of
substantive guidelines or definitions also hinder its effective
use by increasing the risk of litigation.111 The Doha Declaration
merely stated that individual countries have “the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency” in deciding to grant a compulsory license, and thus did little to ameliorate the different interpretive approaches of developed and developing countries.112
109. Id. at 42.
110. Id. at 42, 46. But see id. at 47 (“[U]p to 6 million lives have been saved
since 1995, thanks to an effective international strategy for the diagnosis and
treatment of tuberculosis.”).
111. Gupta, supra note 76, at 640, 647, 649. See also Hestermeyer, supra
note 88, at 247 (stating that members may take different views as to the interpretation, but also that a member relying on one interpretation risks litigation from another member relying on a different interpretation); see also
Gupta, supra note 76, at 637 (“Though TRIPS sets forth minimum standards,
patent protection is not equivalent in each member state since each state can
independently interpret these standards.”).
[M]uch about the interpretation of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement remains in doubt and while the right to access to medicine is a
useful argument to support a broader, more flexible interpretation, it
is merely one argument amongst several. It remains uncertain to
what extent it would carry the day in a dispute settlement proceeding. Faced with the uncertainty about the interpretation . . . and
pressure exerted by developed countries . . . developing countries
have largely foregone imposing such licenses to alleviate health concerns. Indeed, in the wake of the TRIPS Agreement many countries
have limited the provisions on compulsory licensing in their laws.
Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 239–253. But see Johnston & Wasunna, supra
note 47, at S17 (noting that a lack of definitions allows member countries to
have flexibility to interpret TRIPS to meet their own social and cultural values).
112. A New World Order, supra note 86, at 1485. Controversy over the scope
of a public health crisis exists even after Doha, in which the United States
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The flexible scope of compulsory licenses lends to abuse which
further instills resistance and suspicion from pharmaceutical
companies.113 For example, Egypt’s compulsory license for Pfizer’s Viagra tarnishes the reputation of compulsory licensing
because erectile dysfunction is clearly a less dire situation and
one likely not intended to be covered by the public health exception of TRIPS.114 Such excessive abuse and over-use of compulsory licensing likely encourages pharmaceutical companies
to aggressively resist valid uses of compulsory licenses to prevent over-expansion of scope.115 In addition to ambiguity in the
scope of intended diseases, conflicting interpretations exist in
the type of pharmaceutical products intended for compulsory
licensing.116
argues that the agreement’s officially-listed “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics,” are the only possible emergencies, in contrast to the
developing countries that argue for a broader interpretation. Id. at 1485 n.72.
See also Gupta, supra note 76, at 646–647 (“the absence of guidelines, limits
or direction as to the definition of [public health problem] will lead to inconsistent application of the provision and further tension,” as well as include
diseases “not within the Declaration drafter’s intent.”). Thailand’s compulsory license for the heart disease drug, Plavix, was criticized for not satisfying
the national emergency requirement, although it was ultimately granted under the “public, noncommercial use” exception. See, e.g., A New World Order,
supra note 86, at 1486 n.76; see also Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 246–247
(arguing that though “access to medicine supports a broad interpretation . . .
[n]evertheless, the provision is not very attractive for Members in such a situation, as they are reluctant to label their situation one of emergency because
of the effect that would inevitably have on likely investors and tourists.”).
113. See generally McGill, supra note 78, at 87–97 (arguing inconsistencies
in countries’ interpretation of when to grant compulsory licenses leads to
negative consequences).
114. Id. at 89–90. Pfizer responded by stopping construction of a manufacturing facility in Egypt and many pharmaceutical companies have avoided
investing in Egypt. Id.; Egypt’s aggressive compulsory licensing has contributed to a decrease in foreign direct investment “from $948 million in 1987 to
$509.4 million in 2001-02.” Id.
115. Toni Johnson, The Debate Over Generic-Drug Trade, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN
REL.,
http://www.cfr.org/drugs/debate-over-generic-drugtrade/p18055 (last updated Aug. 3, 2011) (“Some experts . . . contend that
drug companies fought so strongly over the licensing of HIV/AIDS drugs because they foresaw that the ‘national emergency’ line would not end at infectious diseases.”).
116. Gupta, supra note 76, at 647. Developed countries define “products
within the pharmaceutical sector” as products “required by a WTO Member
while dealing with public health problems.” Id. In contrast, developing coun-
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The scope of countries that should benefit from compulsory
licensing remains another area of contention.117 Not limiting
the scope of applicable nations may create a chilling effect on
the types of drugs pharmaceutical companies choose to invest
in and develop to avoid the potential for a compulsory license,
which hurts developing nations most in need of help.118 Interpreting the morality exclusion in Article 27(2) also proves difficult, as there is no universally accepted definition.119
In addition to causing differing interpretations between countries, the lack of concrete definitions allows countries to alter
their position to fit their self-interest and creates potential for
abuse.120 For example, despite the United States’ narrow interpretation of TRIPS flexibilities, the United States contradicted
itself during the 2001 anthrax scare by suggesting use of a
compulsory license for Cipro, a drug that combats the effects of
tries include “all medications and vaccines, including active pharmaceutical
substances used in the prevention and treatment of disease and health care,
as well as diagnostic products and products used to administer medicines and
vaccines.” Id.
117. See id. at 648. Doha and the Paragraph 6 Decision in referencing
“countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities,” does not explicitly require that those countries must lack the “resources to purchase medicines from the manufacturer.” Id. This ambiguity may qualify “small, wealthy
nations such as Luxembourg or Singapore” who simply choose not to manufacture certain drugs, even though it may not have been the drafters’ intention. Id. Other countries interpret Doha and the TRIPS flexibilities as applying to only “developing nations not capable of economically implementing
such manufacturing technology . . . . Additionally, it remains unclear exactly
what insufficient manufacturing capacity actually means.” Id.; see also Watson, supra note 13, at 154 (expressing fear that “middle-income nations will
take advantage of compulsory licensing to the detriment of poorer developing
countries . . . . Brazil is not Rwanda, which cannot afford to pay.”).
118. Gerhardsen, supra note 98 (Merck stating that Brazil should not be
granted a compulsory license for efavirenz “as the world’s 12th largest economy, Brazil has a greater capacity to pay for HIV medicines than countries
that are poorer or harder hit by the disease.”).
119. Johnston & Wasunna, supra note 47, at S10, S17. “[E]valuating patent
applications by weighing their impact on ordre public and morality will require expertise that is generally not represented in patent offices.” Id. Arguably, “ordre public is not limited to national security but extends to the protection of human, animal or plant life or health and may be applied to inventions that may lead to serious prejudice to the environment.” Id.
120. See McGill, supra note 78, at 88.
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anthrax.121 On a related note, as India’s government and
pharmaceutical industry’s capabilities grow, the future of India’s willingness to grant compulsory licenses and produce
cheap generic drugs for export to other developing countries is
questionable.122 Indian companies may opt to serve their selfinterest and become “innovator companies” to compete globally
with other large pharmaceutical companies.123
The vagueness of Article 30, which allowed a narrow interpretation to be given by the WTO dispute resolution panel, is a
further impediment to increasing access to medicines.124 Calculating adequate remuneration for payment to the patent holder
when a compulsory license is issued is another obstacle to successful use of TRIPS flexibilities and is further complicated by
the requirement to take the economic value of the authorization into account, as TRIPS does not provide guidance to determine what is ‘adequate’ and what is the authorization’s ‘value.’125 The WTO members’ inability to reach a decision regard121. A New World Order, supra note 86, at 1471 n.7, 1485 n.70 (noting the
hypocrisy of the United States, which has challenged compulsory licenses for
HIV/AIDS drugs while 25 million people dying from AIDS lack access in Africa, and, at the same time, has suggested use of a compulsory license to address anthrax that was clearly not an actual epidemic where only eleven confirmed cases were cited).
122. See Johnston & Wasunna, supra note 47, at S18.
123. Id. “Since 1970, [Indian] domestic firms have increased in number and
since 1999, about 8-10 of these have developed sufficient in house R&D capacity to be able to develop new drug molecules as well as produce bulk
drugs. Indeed, some of these large Indian companies have become multinationals themselves.” WARREN KAPLAN & RICHARD LAING, LOCAL PRODUCTION
OF PHARMACEUTICALS: INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES, HEALTH,
NUTRITION, AND POPULATION FAMILY (HNP) OF THE WORLD BANK’S HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (DISCUSSION PAPER) 15 (Joy de Beyer & Alexander S.
Preker
eds.,
2005),
available
at
http://www.who.int/medicines/technical_briefing/tbs/KaplanLocalProductionF
inal5b15d.pdf.
124. See Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 235 (arguing that the scope of Article 30 exceptions are “notoriously vague,” which could have allowed the Canada—Patent Panel to interpret it broadly in light of a right to access to medicines, but it failed to do so). See generally id. at 234–239; WTO panel decisions are not binding to subsequent decisions. A New World Order, supra
note 86, at 1482 n.54. Nevertheless, subsequent parties and panels usually
rely on the prior decision. Id.
125. Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 247–249; TRIPS, supra note 32, art.
31(h); Chow, supra note 11, at 452–453 (listing possible methods to determin-
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ing parallel importation created a “fundamental flaw” of ambiguity.126 In regard to compulsory licensing under the Paragraph 6 Decision, drugs made for export must be distinguishable by special labels, colors, or shapes to prevent trade diversion.127 However, lack of monitoring guidelines and repercussions makes the re-exportation issue troubling.128
4. Limitations Inherent in Developing Countries
Another impediment to the successful use of the TRIPS flexibilities and the successful achievement of its dual goals is the
endemic and inherent characteristics of developing countries.
Taking advantage of TRIPS flexibilities requires technical expertise, intergovernmental coordination, and legal sophistication, which are often lacking in developing governments.129
Thus, TRIPS flexibilities often do not benefit the least developed countries most in need of help, and rather help middle income countries such as India and Brazil.130 Developing countries also lack proper disease diagnosis capabilities, which hinders their ability to request proper quantities and types of medications in a compulsory license.131 Developing governments
ing adequate remuneration). “For example, Thailand considers a royalty rate
of 0.5% of the total sales to be compliant.” A New World Order, supra, note 85
at 1488 n.90.
126. Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 234. See generally id. at 230–234 (discussing parallel importation and the different interpretations amongst countries).
127. Implementation Agreement, supra note 81, ¶ 2(b)(iii).
128. Gupta, supra note 76, at 648–649.
129. Johnston & Wasunna, supra note 47, at S18–S19.
130. AVERT, supra note 100. “But the problem is that these options are
limited to countries with political clout and financial stability and autonomy.
As is all too often the case, it is the poorest countries already struggling to
manage their HIV epidemics that are the least likely to benefit from the current system.” Id. See also Gerhardsen, supra note 98 (relating a statement by
Merck that Brazil should not be granted a compulsory license for efavirenz
“as the world’s 12th largest economy, Brazil has a greater capacity to pay for
HIV medicines than countries that are poorer or harder hit by the disease.”).
131. See MDG Report 2011, supra note 107, at 44.
More African children are receiving the recommended medicines for
malaria, but accurate diagnosis remains critical. Prompt diagnosis
and treatment are needed to prevent life-threatening complications
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have been criticized for mass military spending when there are
existing public health issues, and so they may need to reevaluate their priorities.132 Developing countries and their citizens
may choose to spend funds on food rather than medication,
even if costs are reduced, if insufficient funds exist to cover
both costs.133 Additionally, some developing governments are
corrupt and may resell medications at higher prices, rather
than distributing the drugs to their citizens.134 A “scrupulous
clean hands approach” must be practiced to ensure drugs are
actually distributed at the lowest profitable prices, and unfortunately such practices have been questionable.135 Further,
lobbying pressure and conflicting interests may create abusive
overuse of compulsory licensing where, for example, “the
chairman of a large generic drug manufacturer was also the
Chairman of the Health Committee in Egypt’s upper house of

from malaria. However, accurate diagnosis is critical. The majority
of childhood fevers, for example, are not due to malaria, and should
not be treated with antimalarial drugs . . . . [P]atients [may be] receiving antimalarial medicines who do not, in fact, have the disease.
Id.
132. See Savoie, supra note 87, at 244 (Thailand has been criticized for
granting a compulsory license for Plavix after increasing “military spending
by thirty percent, to over one billion dollars, while cutting public health expenditures by twelve million dollars.”).
133. Margo A. Bagley, Legal Movements in IP: Trips, Unilateral Action, Bilateral Agreements, and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 781, 794 (2003)
(noting that drug costs are not the only factor impacting access to essential
medicines).
134. Whobrey, supra note 12, at 633.
The incentives created by parallel importation encourages governments to favor profits over people, and since many governments in developing countries are unstable and may be prone to
corruption, the general public in [least-developed countries] sees
neither the critical medications nor realizes any benefits or improvements from the sale of the drugs.
Id.
135. Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 254
(2009). “The level of compensation was questionable in the Thais’ treatment
of Plavix, the compulsory license on Viagra in Egypt was tainted by the appearance of impropriety and self dealing, and complaints about ‘shadow pricing’ in some Latin American countries merit serious attention.” Id.
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Parliament at the time the [Viagra] compulsory license was issued [in Egypt].”136
B. Impediments & Threats
1. Retaliation by Pharmaceutical Companies
Developing countries are cautious in using compulsory licenses to avoid alienating powerful pharmaceutical companies
and business repercussions.137 Pharmaceutical companies
“bring jobs and investments to developing countries.”138 After
Thailand issued a compulsory license for Abbott’s HIV drug,
Kaletra, Abbott stated it would not sell certain drugs in Thailand and withdrew seven new drug applications from Thailand.139 Pharmaceutical companies have also stated that compulsory licenses destroy the incentive to research and develop
drugs to treat diseases affecting developing countries.140
2. Retaliation by Developed Countries
In addition to retaliation by pharmaceutical companies, developing countries also fear retaliation by developed countries.
The possibility of trade sanctions imposed by developed countries against developing countries eliminates the benefits of
granting a compulsory license because any costs saved by the

136. Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing
on Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS.
L.J. 283, 306–07 (2008).
137. See Harris, supra note 86, at 392–393. The forcefulness of the pharmaceutical industry’s response in Thailand and Brazil “may have a discouraging
effect on smaller economies considering similar public health actions but lack
the legal or political resources to defend themselves on the global stage.”
Gerhardsen, supra note 98.
138. Harris, supra note 86, at 392. Brazil’s decision to grant a compulsory
license for Merck’s HIV/AIDS drug could divert investments from Brazil.
Gerhardsen, supra note 98.
139. Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands
from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 317, 444 (2009)
[hereinafter Patent Breaking or Balancing?].
140. Watson, supra note 13, at 153; see Johnston & Wasunna, supra note
47, at S17.
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cheaper medications are offset by other economic sanctions.141
For example, the United States’ Special 301 Watch-List Reports lists countries with inadequate IP protection and allows
imposition of trade sanctions against the offenders.142 Threat of
trade sanctions by the United States, which is Thailand’s biggest export market, forced Thailand to stop producing a generic
version of the HIV drug, didanosine, and amend its domestic
laws to restrict compulsory licenses and parallel importation.143
Increase in border protection measures to prevent harmful
counterfeit drugs may also be another form of retaliation by
developed countries and is a barrier to access to medicines.144
The 2003 European Union border regulations have led to the
seizure of significant quantities of drugs, most of which originated in India and was bound for developing countries such as
Nigeria and Ecuador.145
Developed countries also deviate outside of TRIPS to bind developing countries to more extensive patent protections
141. Patent Breaking or Balancing?, supra note 139, at 447–48. “On why
Brazil has not issued a CL before [2007], ‘[t]he most obvious reason is the
fear of an open conflict with the United States.’” Gerhardsen, supra note 98.
“‘The Thai case, and the recent 301 list report (IPW, US Policy, 30 April
2007), indeed shows that despite the Doha Declaration and all the commitments made, the US is ready to be extremely aggressive . . . .’” Id.
142. Patent Breaking or Balancing?, supra note 139, at 448–49; Watson,
supra note 13, at 151–153 (Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand have all at
some point been placed on the 301 Watch-List).
143. Johnston & Wasunna, supra note 47, at S19.
144. See Harris, supra note 86, at 393; see generally Catherine Dounis, Enforcing IP Rights Via EU Border Regulations: Inhibiting Access to Medicine or
Preventing Counterfeit Medicine?, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 717 (2011).
145. Seuba Xavier, Border Measures Concerning Goods Allegedly Infringing
IP Rights: The Seizures of Generic Medicines in Transit 1 (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, Working
Paper,
2009),
available
at
http://www.iprsonline.org/New%202009/Seuba_Border%20Measures.pdf.
In February 2009 a shipment of second-line generic ARV drugs was
confiscated by Dutch customs authorities. The 49kg of abacavir sulfate tablets produced by an Indian company, Aurobindo, were bound
for a treatment programme in Nigeria. The tablets were later released but the seizure highlighted tensions between the European
Union’s rules on IP rights and World Trade Organization rules concerning the production of generic medicines.
AVERT, supra note 100.
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through bilateral and regional free trade agreements
(“FTAs”).146 Often these FTAs limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities, impose stricter IP standards, and contain data exclusivity
provisions.147 Appropriately, such agreements are commonly
called “TRIPS-plus free trade agreements.”148 Despite the negative effect on access to medicines, developing countries agree to
FTAs to appease and build a relationship with a powerful developed country hoping to gain benefits in other trade areas.149
Further, developing countries have less leverage to negotiate
favorable terms in FTAs where the agreements are often between only two countries of unequal negotiating powers and
thus the developing country lacks the support of other countries.150 As of early 2013, the United States has FTAs with
twenty countries.151 Recently, on October 1, 2011, the United
States signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(“ACTA”) which has been highly criticized for exceeding TRIPS
limitations to a significant degree, violating human rights, and
severely affecting access to medicines.152
146. See generally Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 289–292 (discussing the
challenges posed by FTAs and BITs). TRIPS imposes only minimum standards of IP protection and explicitly allows countries to impose stricter IP regimes “as long as it does not contravene” TRIPS. Bagley, supra note 133, at
792.
147. Harris, supra note 86, at 393–394. Provisions exceeding TRIPS standards are usually referred to as TRIPS-plus provisions. Hestermeyer, supra
note 88, at 289.
148. Bhatt, supra note 35, at 617–618.
149. Id. at 618. As of 2003, there were at least twenty-three bilateral and
regional FTAs containing TRIPS-plus provisions and which affect more than
150 developing countries. Bagley, supra note 133, at 792–93.
150. See Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 291.
151. Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited
Apr. 11, 2013) (listing the current FTAs in which the United States is a party).
152. See Ante, ACTA will be Signed Saturday, FOUND. FOR FREE INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE (Sep. 27, 2011), http://acta.ffii.org/?p=779; see generally
Guadalupe A. Lopez, From Trips to ACTA: Establishing the Intent to Uphold
Access to Medicine in the Face of Ambiguity, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/trips-to-acta-establishing-intent-touphold-access-to-medicine-face-ambiguity. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Nov. 4, 2011) (listing signing members
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3. Legal Challenges
Legal challenges to domestic implementation of compulsory
licensing laws and to compulsory license grants also hinder the
effectiveness of TRIPS, as such challenges delay access to essential medicines and add costs to seeking a compulsory license. In 1997, with the support of the U.S. government, forty
pharmaceutical companies sued the South African government
claiming that the South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 violated TRIPS.153
Similarly, in 2000, the United States challenged the compulsory licensing provisions of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law
in a petition to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.154 As of
2012, Indian generic manufacturers Cipla and Natco face separate patent infringement lawsuits in the Delhi High Court by
Bayer Pharmaceuticals for its patented cancer drug Nexavar.155
and access to full text of ACTA); see ACTA Fact Sheet, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/acta-fact-sheet-march-2010
(Mar. 2010) (providing information on the goals of ACTA); see ACTA: Meeting
U.S. Objectives, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/september/actameeting-us-objectives (Oct. 2011) (explaining that “ACTA is consistent with
existing U.S. law and does not require the enactment of implementing legislation.”).
153. McGill, supra note 78, at 87–88. The Act attempted to allow generic
production of patented antiretroviral HIV drugs. Id. However, public outcry
eventually forced the pharmaceutical companies to withdraw the suit. Id. The
United States also placed South Africa on its Special 301 Watch List and attempted to challenge the Act’s validity before a WTO panel before withdrawing due to public pressure. Watson, supra note 13, at 152.
154. Chow, supra note 11, at 454–546. Again, the United States withdrew
the WTO challenge in exchange for Brazil’s agreement to hold negotiations
with the United States prior to granting any compulsory license. Id.
155. Varun Chhonkar, Nexavar: Compulsory license will severely impact
global pharma companies, PATENT CIRCLE (Aug. 11, 2011, 12:23 PM),
http://patentcircle.blogspot.com/2011/08/nexavar-compulsory-licensewill.html. Bayer’s lawsuit, filed in March 2010 against Cipla for its marketing of a generic version of Nexavar, is currently pending in the Delhi High
Court. Id. In May 2011, Bayer also filed an infringement lawsuit against
Natco in response to Nacto’s compulsory license request. Id.; see HIGH COURT
OF DELHI, Status of Cases: Orders/Judgments of [CS(OS)1090/2011],
http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhc_case_status_oj_list.asp?pno=577484 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (for court documents and status of the case —Bayer Corporation & Anr vs. Natco Pharma Limited); see HIGH COURT OF DELHI, Status
of
Cases:
Orders/Judgments
of
[CS(OS)523/2010],
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III. SPECIAL CHALLENGES IN ACCESS TO CHRONIC DISEASE
MEDICATIONS
A current shift in focus from infectious disease compulsory licensing to chronic disease compulsory licensing poses new implications for patent holders and those who seek access to such
medicines.156 “Compulsory licensing practices, however, continue to expand from responding to purely national emergencies
toward addressing everyday health care.”157 As the U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon noted:
Commonly known as chronic or lifestyle-related diseases, the
main non-communicable diseases are cardiovascular diseases,
diabetes, cancers and chronic respiratory diseases. While the
international community has focused on communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, the four
main non-communicable diseases have emerged relatively
unnoticed in the developing world and are now becoming a
global epidemic.158

http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhc_case_status_oj_list.asp?pno=535397 (last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (court documents and status of the case —Bayer Corporation & Anr. Vs. Cipla Ltd.); see generally Indian Pharma Patent Cases,
PATENT DAILY, http://patentdaily.wordpress.com/indian-pharma-patent-cases/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (listing a summary of pharmaceutical patent infringement lawsuits filed in India).
156. See generally Savoie, supra note 87.
157. DeRoo, supra note 95, at 354.
158. U.N. Secretary-General, Prevention and Control of Non-communicable
Diseases, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/66/83 (May 19, 2011).
In 2008, 36 million people died from non-communicable diseases,
representing 63 per cent of the 57 million global deaths that year
[and 80 per cent of those deaths occurred in the developing world]. In
2030, such diseases are projected to claim the lives of 52 million people . . . . While non-communicable diseases have traditionally afflicted mostly high income populations, current evidence shows that the
spread of such diseases is associated with increasing levels of development. Death and disease from non-communicable diseases now
outstrip communicable diseases in every region except Africa, where
the rate of such diseases is quickly rising. By 2030, noncommunicable diseases are projected to cause nearly five times as
many deaths as communicable diseases worldwide, including in lowand middle-income countries.
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Developing countries are beginning to view “cancer as no less
serious than HIV/AIDS.”159 Thailand’s 2007 compulsory license
for the blood thinner Plavix (used to treat heart disease) was
likely motivated by data estimating thirty thousand cancer
deaths annually compared to twenty-one thousand AIDS related deaths in Thailand in 2006.160 Similarly, the Indian generic
drug maker, Natco, cited over 24,000 Indian deaths per year in
its compulsory license application for Bayer’s liver and kidney
cancer drug, Nexavar.161
Id. at 2; see David Brennan, former chief executive of AstraZeneca, Address
on Behalf of AstraZeneca to the World Health Assembly (May 17, 2011),
available
at
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Events/Other_IFPMA_Events/17_Ma
y_2011/David_Brennan_Speech_Luncheon_17May2011.pdf (WHO research
shows that 90% of deaths from non-communicable diseases are in developing
countries, and will increase by 17% by 2015. Africa is seeing the greatest increase by 27% compared to Europe’s 6% increase); see generally Raising the
Priority of Non-communicable Diseases in Development Work at Global and
HEALTH
ORGANIZATION,
National
Levels,
WORLD
http://www.who.int/nmh/events/2010/ncd_facts_20100913.pdf (2010) [hereinafter Raising the Priority].
159. The 10 burning questions on the Government Use of Patents on the four
anti-cancer drugs in Thailand, THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE
NATIONAL
HEALTH
SECURITY
OFFICE
THAILAND,
at
2,
http://www.moph.go.th/hot/Second_white_paper_on_the_Thai_CL_%5BEN%5
D.pdf (Feb. 2008).
160. Johnson, supra note 115. In 2005, heart disease was estimated to be
the second leading cause of death in Thailand. Porapakkham et al., Estimated causes of death in Thailand, 2005: implications for health policy,
HEALTH
METRICS
(May
18,
2010),
POPULATION
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2885317/ppd/1478-7954-814.pdf.
161. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE, No. 32/2011, at 13349, Dec.
8,
2011
(India),
available
at
http://donttradeourlivesaway.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/official_journal_12
082011_part_i.pdf [hereinafter Natco CL Request]. “In 2008 approximately
20,144 cases of [liver cancer] were reported in India, and more than 18,043
Indians died of [liver cancer].” Id. at 13347. “In 2008, about 8,900 Indians
were diagnosed with kidney cancer, and about 5,733 died from the disease.”
Id. at 13348. Nacto argues that Bayer’s life-saving product is exorbitantly
priced and of limited availability in India, and Indians “should be able to access this drug irrespective of their caste, creed, affordability etc.” Id. at
13352. Natco states that it can price the generic version “31 times cheaper
than Bayer’s sorafenib tosylate [commonly known as Nexavar] or 3% of the
price at which Bayer sells the drug in India.” James Love, Update on the So-
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Developing countries, despite evidence of growing deaths
from chronic disease within their populations, face special challenges in using compulsory licenses to combat chronic diseases
as compared to infectious disease compulsory licensing. First,
the Doha Declaration uses language of epidemics and infectious disease.162 Second, lack of public attention and misconception that chronic disease affects only wealthy countries removes pressure on pharmaceutical companies to provide such
medications at affordable prices for populations in developing
countries.163 Further, because chronic diseases can be combatted by non-pharmaceutical means, it may be more difficult for
developing countries to cite compulsory license use as necessary.164 Lastly, expanding the scope of compulsory licenses to
chronic diseases will likely be met by even stronger resistance
from pharmaceutical companies because the inclusion of
“chronic, non-communicable diseases like cancer hits at the
rafenib Tosylate Compulsory Licensing Case in India, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT’L (Oct. 10, 2011, 4:32 PM), http://lists.keionline.org/pipermail/iphealth_lists.keionline.org/2011-October/001392.html.
162. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 70, ¶ 5(c) (“[I]t being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”).
163. See McGill, supra note 78, at 88; see Savoie, supra note 87, at 239. Advocacy efforts supporting compulsory licenses have focused on access to
HIV/AIDS medications. Id. Pharmaceutical companies are likely to avoid the
public relations nightmare faced when they attempted to sue South Africa
after its passage of the Medicine and Related Substance Control Amendment
Act of 1997, intended to begin generic product of HIV drugs. Id.; see generally
MDG Report 2011, supra note 107 (failing to include chronic disease as a development, but including infectious diseases); see Preventing Chronic Diseases
HEALTH
ORGANIZATION,
a
Vital
Investment,
WORLD
http://www.who.int/chp/chronic_disease_report/contents/part1.pdf (2005) at 4,
8–10 (explains ten widespread misunderstandings about chronic disease and
the reality).
164. See Raising the Priority, supra note 158, at 3–4 (noting that chronic
diseases are preventable by life-style changes such as tobacco use, diet, physical activity, and alcohol use). In contrast, the “WHO recommends that countries use a combination of antimalarial medicines to reduce the risk of drug
resistance” as the best treatment for the infectious disease of malaria. What
is the best treatment against malaria? Why combine drugs?, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/features/qa/26/en/index.html (2009) (last
visited May 10, 2012).

1220

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

heart of the drug industry’s profit model.”165 For example, a
dramatic decline in foreign direct investment and research establishments was seen in Thailand after it granted a compulsory license for a heart disease medication in 2007.166
IV. RECOMMENDATION & PROPOSAL
The shortcomings of TRIPS reveal that compulsory licensing
is an ineffective solution to the problem of access to essential
medicines. The impediments of TRIPS further illuminate the
likely inability of TRIPS to effectively cope with the increasing
global threat of chronic diseases. Drug prices need to be reduced in order to increase access to medicines. However, broadrange compulsory license use is not a viable solution because it
jeopardizes the research and development structure of pharmaceutical companies.167 Pharmaceutical companies argue that
strict patent laws and high drug prices are necessary to recoup
large research and development costs (“R&D”).168 Thus, to low-

165. Johnson, supra note 115. See also Savoie, supra note 87, at 241 (“Medications for chronic diseases play a much larger role in pharmaceutical portfolios than do medications for infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.”). Pharmaceutical companies focus drug discovery on chronic disease because “patients look forward to months, even years, of treatment” and hence prolonged
profits whereas infectious disease often only requires short-term therapy.
Steven J. Projan, Why is Big Pharma Getting Out of Antibacterial Drug Discovery?, 6 CURRENT OPINION MICROBIOLOGY 427, 428 (2003).
166. McGill, supra note 78, at 91 (“Gross private investment growth fell
from 10.6% to .5% in 2007, its lowest since 2000” largely due to the $10 billion decline in foreign direct investment in 2007).
167. DeRoo, supra note 95, at 354. “Given that pharmaceutical companies
make a marginal profit of less than 20% across all their products the view
that pharmaceuticals are ‘grossly overpriced’ is at best naïve and for the development of novel [products] it is fatal.” Projan, supra note 165, at 428.
168. Johnson, supra note 115.
Research and development averages between ten and fifteen years in
the United States and is included as part of the twenty-year patent—meaning the average drug patent, once on the market, lasts
about eleven years, according to the lobby group PhRMA. R&D for
2010 was about $67 billion, growing less than $11 billion between
2006 and 2010 . . . . Few drugs ever recoup their R&D costs, notes
PhRMA, and even fewer ever reach the incredible earning potential
of a drug such as Lipitor, which made nearly $11 billion in sales in
2010 but expired in the United States in 2011. Overall, drug compa-
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er drug prices, the current business model of recouping R&D
costs through profits should be adjusted. A new business model
to recoup R&D costs, while lowering prices, should be approached through funding and incentives.169 R&D models built
on public-private partnerships170 that help in financing and
product development may help promote efficiency, access, innovation, and information sharing.171 Alternative sources of
funding R&D through partnership efforts, rather than expanding the scope of compulsory licenses, should be used to lower
drug prices and increase access.172 If alternative sources of
funding are used, rather than the current business model of
using profits to recoup R&D costs, then pharmaceutical companies should be more willing to lower drug prices and reduce
resistance to compulsory licenses. A funding approach that relies less on recouping R&D costs will also encourage development of drugs that may primarily benefit developing countries173 because, despite the lower profit potential, a greater
nies are spending less on research and bringing fewer drugs to market than a decade ago.
Id. But see Bob Young & Michael Surrusco, Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against
The Drug Industry’s R&D “Scare Card,” PUBLIC CITIZEN, July 2001 (arguing
that the pharmaceutical industry’s claim that extraordinary profits are needed “to fund expensive, risky and innovative research and development [R&D]
for new drugs” is misleading).
169. See Brennan, supra note 158 (relating a statement of interest made by
the CEO of AstraZeneca regarding working together to create “commercially
sustainable business models” that enable healthcare access to more people).
170. See Frederick M. Abbott, IP and Public Health: Meeting the Challenge
of Sustainability 32 (GLOBAL HEALTH PROGRAMME, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND,
WORKING PAPER NO. 7/2011, Nov. 15, 2011). Such public-private organizations
include the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Drugs for Neglected Diseases
initiative (“DNDi”), and the Medicines Patent Pool (“MPP”). Id.
171. See generally id.
172. See James Love, Will the UN backtrack on accessible medicine?,
FOR
HEALTH
HUMAN
RIGHTS
&
DEVELOPMENT,
CENTER
http://www.cehurd.org/2011/10/will-the-un-backtrack-on-accessible-medicine/
(Oct. 31, 2011) (“Developing countries cannot improve access to cancer drugs
unless they grant more compulsory licenses on patents, or undertake more
fundamental and radical changes in the way research and development . . .
for cancer drugs is financed.”).
FOR
NEGLECTED
DISEASES
INITIATIVE,
173. See
DRUGS
http://www.dndi.org/overview-dndi.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). DNDi is
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percentage of revenues will constitute pure profit and will not
count against R&D expenses.174 Such a result will hopefully
close the “10/90 research gap,” a disparity resulting from only
10% of the worldwide R&D being devoted to health problems
that affect the poorest 90% of the world’s population.175
Further, compulsory licenses should be limited in scope to increase legitimacy, decrease resistance and fear of retaliation,
and decrease abuse. If the scope of compulsory licenses is better defined, then all players would have proper notice. More
specifically, if pharmaceutical companies are re-assured that a
compulsory license would not open a floodgate and destroy a
wide-array of patents, they will be more willing to acquiesce.176
Similarly, better guidance will help the least developing countries to invoke legitimate compulsory licenses and prevent abusive use of compulsory licensing, such as Viagra in Egypt and
Cipro in the United States.177 Minimizing discretionary use will
bring legitimacy to the compulsory license process.178 However,

a public-private partnership that promotes research and development for
neglected diseases that often afflict developing populations. Id.
174. See generally Research and Development, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story079/en/index.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2011).
175.
The 10/90 research gap refers to the finding that only 10% of the
US$55 billion global spending on health research is devoted to diseases or conditions that account for 90% of the global burden of disease. For each year of potential life lost in the industrialized world,
more than 200 times as much is spent on health research as is spent
for each year lost in the developing world.
Id.
176. Johnson, supra note 115 (“[D]rug companies fought so strongly over
the licensing of HIV/AIDS drugs because they foresaw that the ‘national
emergency’ line would not end at infectious diseases.”); Nexavar to Storm
India:
Compulsory
License
Plea
Filed,
BIOSPECTRUM,
http://www.biospectrumasia.com/content/020911IND17008.asp
(Sept.
2,
2011) (last visited May 10, 2012) (“[E]xtensive use of compulsory licenses will
in the long-term undermine and threaten the patent system.”).
177. See McGill, supra note 78, at 88–96 (arguing that the “[c]itizens of the
most underdeveloped countries have suffered as a result of the discretionary
allowances of the Doha Declaration.”).
178. Id. at 75 (“Unchecked discretion for compulsory licensing has made
compulsory licenses a dirty word for economic development and erected a
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some flexibility in scope is necessary to allow adaptation of
compulsory licenses to changing global disease threats.179
TRIPS should therefore be amended to require WTO panels
to take a more active role in compulsory license applications, as
opposed to allowing complete discretion on the part of national
governments.180 Since approving generic production of a patented medication already may take several years—due to the
various obstacles discussed above—WTO panel decisions will
not significantly prolong the process.181 To determine whether a
compulsory license is necessary and the claimed disease is a
true national public health emergency,182 the WTO panel
should use an analysis akin to U.S. courts’ strict scrutiny test
as applied to laws infringing on U.S. citizens’ Constitutional
rights.183 The WTO panel should consider the national disease
burden as well as the country’s ability to cope, the marketed
price of the patented medication compared to the proposed
barrier between generic drugs and the least developed countries that need
them.”).
179. See id. at 83 (arguing that “a pre-determined list of diseases that may
benefit from compulsory licensing is not in the public’s best interest; diseases
that threaten public health mutate, evolve, and present unforeseeable degrees of gravity, mortality, contagiousness, and treatability.”).
180. See id. at 97 (“An administrative body through the WTO with representatives from both developed and developing countries may be in a better
position to determine when countries may issue a compulsory license” and
give developing countries a louder voice).
181. See Cipla Launches Nexavar Generic at 1/10th of Bayer’s Price, MONEY
CONTROL,
http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/cipla-launchesnexavar-generic-at-110thbayer39s-price_450770.html# (Apr. 8, 2010) (last
visited May 10, 2012) (“Bayer has succeeded in blocking the launch of [the]
generic version [of the patented drug Nexavar] for two years by filing a writ
petition in Delhi High Court . . . .”).
182. See Reichman, supra note 135, at 254 (noting an argument for
“[n]arrowly tailored licenses that focus on real public health needs and avoid
the appearance of impropriety, and that also ensure consumers actually obtain lower prices.”).
183. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4
(1938). U.S. courts apply strict scrutiny where a fundamental U.S. Constitutional or a fundamental right is infringed. Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE
(Aug.
19,
2010),
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny. To pass strict scrutiny, the
policy must be justified by a compelling government interest, narrowly tailored, and be the least restrictive means for achieving the interest. Id.
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price of the generic, the consumer’s ability to pay, and market
availability of the patented drug.184 The panel should also
weigh the harm to the pharmaceutical company’s profit and
future floodgate impact.185
In addition to a strict scrutiny analysis by a WTO panel prior
to the compulsory license, TRIPS Article 31(b)186 should be
amended to require good-faith prior negotiations even during a
public health emergency. This will also hopefully reduce the
burden and amount of cases that reach the proposed WTO panel. Pharmaceutical companies and developed countries would
be less resistant to compulsory licenses if they felt they had a
say in license determinations. In fact, because negotiations prior to compulsory licensing are already in practice and expected,187 such an amendment would not be a drastic departure
from current practice. A timeline for deal-making negotiations
should be clearly established in TRIPS, limiting parties’ negotiation period to a set number of days before a compulsory license can be filed with the proposed WTO panel.188 After the
deadline for negotiations expires, the WTO panel would then be
compelled to step in and conduct its strict scrutiny analysis.
Further, to prevent a party from stalling or refusing to negotiate, negotiations must be conducted in good faith, and the WTO

184. See Reichman, supra note 135, at 254; see generally Natco CL Request,
supra note 161.
185. See generally Brennan, supra note 158; See also Public Policy Position:
(July
2008),
Compulsory
Licensing,
MERCK
http://www.merck.com/about/views-andpositions/compulsory_licensing2009.pdf.
186. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 31(b).
187. See Chow, supra note 11, at 454–546. The United States withdrew the
WTO challenge to Brazil’s compulsory licensing provisions of the Brazilian
Industrial Property Law in exchange for Brazil’s agreement to hold negotiations with the United States prior to granting any compulsory license. Id. See
also Natco CL Request, supra note 161, at 13358.
188. See Natco Pharma Applies for India’s First Compulsory License, ALL
PATENTS
(Aug.
2,
2011,
9:14
PM),
ABOUT
http://patentsind.blogspot.com/2011/08/natco-pharma-applies-for-indiasfirst.html. Indian patent law requires a three year waiting period after a patent is granted before a compulsory license may be filed. Id. See also Natco
CL Request, supra note 161, at 13354.
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panel should consider in its analysis whether good faith negotiations occurred.189
The narrowed scope of the compulsory license should be balanced with a market approach to provide access to a broad
range of medicines. Global pharmaceutical companies should
be encouraged to compete with generic drug makers through
government incentives and sell needed patented medication
using a three-tier pricing system.190 To encourage pharmaceutical companies to compete with generic drug manufacturers,
governments should incentivize local manufacture by the global pharmaceutical company.191 The demand for generic drugs
exists in developing countries, hence there is a marketplace
and thus a profit potential as well.192 Local manufacture and
189. Natco’s December 6, 2010, letter requesting a license was turned down
“point blank, without any discussion whatsoever” in a refusal letter sent
three weeks later, on December 27, by patentee Bayer. Id. at 13358–59.
190. See Watson, supra note 13, at 154–57.
191. See generally KAPLAN & LAING, supra note 123. It is important to note
that because generic production occurs only in countries that have manufacturing capability, global pharmaceuticals need only locally manufacture in
middle-income developing countries where generic competitors exist. Id. Middle-income developing countries presumably have more political stability
than low-income developing countries and so the risk of local manufacture is
less, although inherently present. Id. Governments of middle-income developing countries, like India, Thailand, and Brazil, also have more ability to provide incentives for local manufacture. Id.
192. See THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION, WHO/EDM/PAR/2004.5 (2004),
at 31–41.
The global generic medicines market is worth over US$ 80 billion,
about 30% of total sales . . . . In high-income countries, “originator”
(patented) pharmaceuticals account for two-thirds of sales and the
share of these in total sales grew substantially from 1990 to 2000. In
low-income countries, these [“originator” (patented)] pharmaceuticals account for only about one-third of total sales. Generic pharmaceuticals represent almost two-thirds of total sales in low-income
countries and about 60% of sales in middle-income countries. Branded generics are much more important than unbranded generics in
sales. Some countries in transition have experienced a rapid change
in the composition of their pharmaceutical sales, with generics rapidly being replaced by originator brands or by pharmaceuticals made
under licence from originators.
Id. at 31.
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competition by global pharmaceutical companies with generic
drug manufacturers would reduce the problem of patent infringement, eliminate the need for broad scope compulsory licenses, and provide for a wider range of drugs accessible to developing countries. Local manufacture will also give pharmaceutical companies greater control of their product as well as
provide developing countries with safer drugs.193 Global pharmaceuticals should be free to then open factories in developing
countries and compete with local generic manufacturers, thus
offering healthy market competition.194 However, since generic
drugs are sold more cheaply, global pharmaceuticals will have
to develop a differential pricing system to effectively compete
with the generic drug makers.195
Pharmaceutical companies should differentially price drugs
in low-income developing countries, middle-income developing
countries, and developed countries according to the national
median urban income in the respective country category.196
193. See Johnson, supra note 115.
[I]mporting inexpensive patented drugs and generics from other
countries will erode safety standards . . . . And some experts note a
massive influx of generic drugs could help mask increases in the
counterfeit drug trade, already a multibillion dollar industry and expected to see a 90 percent jump in global sales from 2005 to 2010.
The U.S. Food and Drug Agency estimates counterfeit drugs represent as much 30 percent of all drugs sold in some developing countries, but amount to less than 1 percent of drugs in the developed
world.
Id. The majority of private manufacturers in India are “small-scale and have
problematic quality assurance systems and procedures.” KAPLAN & LAING,
supra note 123, at 15.
194. See McGill, supra note 78, at 90–91. Global pharmaceuticals have previously built manufacturing facilities in developing countries. See id. Pfizer
was in the process of constructing a manufacturing facility in Egypt before
Egypt granted a compulsory license for Viagra. Id. Some companies have also
set up research establishment in Thailand and more would have been built
had Thailand not been aggressive in its compulsory licensing. Id.
195. See generally Whobrey, supra note 12 (suggesting a 2-tier pricing
structure based on GDP).
196. See generally PRASHANT YADAV, DIFFERENTIAL PRICING FOR
PHARMACEUTICALS: REVIEW OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE, NEW FINDINGS AND
IDEAS FOR ACTION, U.K. DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(2010),
available
at
http://www.accesstomedicineindex.org/sites/www.accesstomedicineindex.org/f
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Prices set at the urban population’s income levels, rather than
the rural population, will be more economically feasible for
global pharmaceutical companies.197 Further, a three-tier pricing system will allow pharmaceutical companies to balance
lower prices in developing countries with the higher prices in
developed countries. Because the majority of sales occur in developed countries, lower prices in developing countries will not
be a significant burden on profits.198 Such reduced profits
should be considered as “additional” profits that otherwise
would not exist, instead of being negatively viewed as “reduced” profits. Moreover, to incentivize pharmaceutical companies to employ a three-tier pricing system, TRIPS must be
amended to prohibit parallel importation and diversion of
drugs. Governments and international organizations should
regulate and police the re-importation issue, and the WTO
should impose trade sanctions on repeat offenders.
Governments of both the developed and the developing countries should provide more incentives to global pharmaceutical
companies to invest in a local factory.199 Such incentives could
iles/yadav_differential_pricing_for_pharmaceuticals.pdf;
see
generally
Jayashree Watal, Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential
Drugs,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION
(Apr.
2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wto_background_e.pdf.
197. See YADAV, supra note 196, at 5 (“It is important to note that differential pricing is not a panacea to ensuring access. For patients with affordability levels lower than the marginal cost of manufacturing, donor subsidies and
government support will continue to be required.”).
198. See Kevin Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations
for Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 159, 160 (2006)
(80% to 90% of global sales of patented pharmaceuticals occur in the thirty
wealthiest countries in the OECD. Patented pharmaceuticals could be offered
at generic prices to middle and low income countries, which include more
than 84% of the world’s population, with only a small reduction in global
R&D cost recovery). “In 1999, the 15% of the world’s population who live in
high-income countries purchased and consumed about 90% of total medicines,
by value. . . . The market share of the USA alone rose from 18.4% of the world
total in 1976 to over 52% in 2000.” THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION, supra
note 192, at 31.
199. See, e.g., TURKISH HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY REPORT 4 (Aug. 2010), available
at
http://www.invest.gov.tr/enUS/infocenter/publications/Documents/HEALTHCARE.INDUSTRY.pdf (introducing incentives to attract foreign investors to Turkey).
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include: tax breaks, free land to build the factory, or government funds to build the factory.200 Both developed and developing country governments can provide tax breaks to pharmaceutical companies in return for selling medicine at reduced prices
for developing populations. Developed governments can base
tax incentives on a gradient system, where tax deduction increases as the quantity of reduced priced drugs supplied to developing countries increases. Developing governments can give
tax breaks for a set number of years to the pharmaceutical
company. Thus, any burden is shared by all, the pharmaceutical companies, the developed countries, and the developing
countries.
The pharmaceutical company would be allowed to make and
keep more of the profits from selling their drug in the local
market while using workers and labor from the local country.201
This suggested solution would allow the global pharmaceutical
company to make a profit, while providing a public service of
increasing access to safe medicine and stimulating the local
economy by using their labor. As a result, a pharmaceutical
company’s public relations image will also improve. By driving
the generic drug makers out of business, global pharmaceuticals will not have to worry about enforcing their patent rights
as the market will take care of it. Although, in this suggested
solution, global pharmaceuticals would be making less profit in
developing countries than in developed countries, they would
still be making a profit and not incurring a loss, particularly
when pricing is based on the urban population coupled with
government and market incentives. Further benefits include
improved goodwill and reputation, increased control, as well as
reduced parallel importation and illegal competition.
Differential pricing is only feasible when coupled with official
support, such as amending TRIPS to prohibit parallel importation.202 Potential for diversion of drugs from one market to an200. See Watson, supra note 13, at 156.
201. See KAPLAN & LAING, supra note 123, at 15 (“India’s rich natural resources and manpower have not been fully exploited.”); see id. at 32 (noting,
however, that few developing countries would have the PhD level skills and
technical staff for many of the jobs required in the pharmaceutical industry).
202. See YADAV, supra note 196, at 6. “Despite its theoretical appeal and
some notable successes, the use of differential pricing as a tool to improve
access to medicines is not widespread. The primary causes include risks of
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other eliminates the incentive for companies to engage in differential pricing, leading to a single, world-wide uniform pricing scheme.203 Banning parallel exports will increase the supply available to needy consumers because it removes the demand by distributors.204 Only the intended needy consumers
will have access, and thus, as the drug will not be siphoned by
distributors, the number of such consumers who will actually
have access to the drug will increase. Re-importation should be
policed and regulated.205 Countries should implement domestic
legislation to comply with this amendment to ban parallel importation, and countries in violation should be punished with
trade sanction. Further, violating countries would be harmed
by backlash from pharmaceutical companies who would likely
opt not to locally manufacture their product.206 Further, violating countries will also likely suffer a decrease in foreign direct
investment.207
Any solution will need to address the realities and challenges
of compulsory licensing, including the differing priorities of IP
and public health interests. An easy solution does not exist and
every solution comes with its own set of additional challenges.
For example, any amendment to TRIPS—whether to limit the
scope of compulsory licenses by better defining “public health
emergency,” creating WTO panels that employ strict scrutiny
to assess the validity of a compulsory license request, requiring
good faith prior negotiations, or banning parallel importation—
is a difficult task. In fact, there has only been one amendment
physical arbitrage (lower priced product flowing back to the high income
markets) . . . .” Id.; see Watson, supra note 13, at 157.
203. See generally A. Bryan Baer, Price Controls Through the Back Door:
The Parallel Importation of Pharmaceuticals, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 109 (2001)
(arguing a uniform pricing scheme would likely be set at a high price based
on affordability and profit potential from developed countries).
204. See id. at 134.
205. See Watson, supra note 13, at 157.
206. See McGill, supra note 78, at 90 (describing how Pfizer responded to
the Viagra compulsory license by halting construction of a manufacturing
plant in Egypt).
207. See McGill, supra note 78, at 90–92. Foreign direct investment (“FDI”)
in Thailand declined by $10 billion in 2007 as a backlash to widespread compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. Id. Similarly, FDI in Egypt dropped
from $948 million in 1987 to $509.4 million in 2001-02. Id.
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to TRIPS in the approximately fifteen years since its inception.208 An amendment to TRIPS requires acceptance by twothirds of the WTO member countries, and the amendment will
only affect those member countries having accepted the
amendment.209 Furthermore, once an amendment is adopted,
domestic legislation must be drafted and adopted in the individual countries.210 Moreover, amending TRIPS to better define
“public health emergency” is in itself a delicate task, where a
balance between removing ambiguity and retaining enough
flexibility to adapt to changes is important. Defining and limiting “public health emergency” will eliminate ambiguity, decrease abuse, and decrease resistance from developed countries
and the global pharmaceutical industry. However, even a more
concrete definition requires enough flexibility to withstand
changes in time and adapt to changes in trends. In addition, a
market approach to supplement amendments to TRIPS also
poses difficulties. For example, much coordination would be
necessary among WTO member country governments, global
pharmaceutical companies, and local generic manufacturers to
prevent parallel importation, encourage local manufacture and
healthy competition, and create a three-tier pricing scheme.
Coordination and internal restructuring within the global
pharmaceutical industry would also be required, which will
likely be a time consuming and complicated process.
CONCLUSION
TRIPS has been important in making strides toward access
to essential medicines for developing populations. Despite noble efforts, however, many still lack access to life-saving medications. The spirit of TRIPS and its dual goal of improving
medical access while preserving patent rights should be continued and enhanced. Legitimacy cannot be sacrificed for effi208. How to Accept the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/accept_e.htm (last visited Mar.
29, 2013) [hereinafter Amending TRIPS].
209. See Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated
Nov. 5, 2012).
210. Amending TRIPS, supra note 208.
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ciency and, accordingly, compulsory license use should be limited in scope to true public health emergencies with the help of
WTO panel decisions. Market forces, such as government incentives, international cooperation and public-private partnerships between advocacy groups and pharmaceutical companies
should be used as the dominant route to improving access to
medicines and preserving patent rights.
Collaboration with pharmaceutical companies is the most
commercially viable solution for balancing TRIPS’ dual goals.
Working against pharmaceutical companies by merely broadening compulsory license use is not realistically viable, as the
many obstacles to compulsory license use has shown. With
chronic diseases on the rise, TRIPS and pharmaceutical business models need to be adjusted to combat new global concerns.
There is still a long road ahead to improving global access to
medications and, although TRIPS was a major step, it cannot
be the end of the road. New measures and methods need to be
created and adopted to treat the expanding global threat of diseases.
Dina Halajian
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